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better qualified simply because of minority origins.""1
The Spurlock decision qualifies as an important precedent for a
sympathetic lower court response to the Burger Court's cautious ap-
proach toward enforcement of the constitutional rights of minorities. 8
Had the court seen fit to apply either a "business necessity" approach
or the standards provided by the EEOC Guidelines, United's task would
have been measurably greater. If the goals of Title VII are not to be
abandoned, the courts must carefully consider the availability of alter-
natives and the specific problems they themselves present, and weigh
these against the inequity of current hiring practices. If less discrimina-
tory alternatives are feasible the courts should be extremely reluctant
to condone existing discriminatory impacts. The "headwinds" against
minorities have not yet dissipated; the advanced technology and elevated
production standards of modern corporations should not blind the
courts to the portentous consequences of permitting employers to reject
qualified minority applicants merely because their white applicants are
"better" qualified.
SAXBY M. CHAPLIN
Estate Tax-Administrative Expense Deductions-
A Reaffirmation of the Section 2053(a)
Standard
The transfer of property at death results in the levy of federal estate
taxes upon the taxable estate, that is, the gross estate less allowable
deductions and exemptions.' One of the allowable deductions from the
gross estate is that of administration expenses provided for in section
2053(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.2 Treasury Regulations
6401 U.S. at 436.
"See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2051.
21NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2053(a) provides:
General Rule.-For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001, the value of the
taxable estate shall be determined by deducting from the value of the gross estate such
amounts-
(1) for funeral expenses,
(2) for administration expenses,
(3) for claims against the estate, and
(4) for unpaid mortages on, or any indebtedness
[Vol. 52
ESTATE TAX
sections 20.2053-3(a)3 and 20.2053-3(d)(2)4 limit the deduction for ex-
penses associated with the sale of property to situations where the sale
was necessary to preserve the estate, pay debts of the estate, or to effect
distribution. However, in Estate of Park v. Commissioner,5 the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the necessity requirement im-
posed by these regulations to the extent that they apply to the sale of
probate property and held that the exclusive criterion for deductibility
under section 2053(a)6 should be the determination provided for in the
statute itself-the allowability under the laws of the jurisdiction in which
the estate is being administered.
7
Mabel F. Colton Park's will was admitted to probate on March 8,
1968. Her probate estate8 included a residence and a cottage that were
to pass to her four sons under the residuary clause of the will, a situation
which the Tax Court conceded might prove administratively inconven-
in respect of, property where the value of the decedent's interest therein, undiminished
by such mortgage or indebtedness, is included in the value of the gross estate . . . as
are allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction, whether within or without the United
States, under which the estate is being administered.
3Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(a) (1958) provides:
In general. The amounts deductible from a decedent's gross estate as "administra-
tion expenses" of the first category (see paragraphs (a) and (c) of § 20.2053-I) are
limited to such expenses as are actually and necessarily incurred in the administration
of the decedent's estate; that is, in the collection of assets, payment of debts, and
distribution of property to the persons entitled to it. The expenses contemplated in the
law are such only as attend the settlement of an estate and the transfer of the property
of the estate to individual beneficiaries or to a trustee, whether the trustee is the executor
or some other person. Expenditures not essential to the proper settlement of the estate,
but incurred for the individual benefit of the heirs, legatees, or devisees, may not be taken
as deductions. Administration expenses include (1) executor's commissions; (2) attor-
ney's fees; and (3) miscellaneous expenses. Each of these classes is considered separately
in paragraphs (b) through (d) of this section.
'Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(d)(2) (1958) provides in part:
Expenses for selling property of the estate are deductible if the sale is necessary in
order to pay the decedent's debts, expenses of administration, or taxes, to preserve the
estate, or to effect distribution. The phrase "expenses for selling property" includes
brokerage fees and other expenses attending the sale, such as the fees of an auctioneer
if it is reasonably necessary to employ one.
5475 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1973).
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2053(a), quoted in note 2 supra.
7475 F.2d at 676.
'The probate estate consisted of the following:
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ient.9 The sons decided that they would prefer the readily divisible cash
proceeds from a sale of the real estate and therefore requested the
administrator to sell the properties under the power given him in the
will. Brokerage fees and other expenses incurred in selling the property
were included in the administrative expenses listed in the annual probate
accountings and were approved for deduction from the principal of the
estate by the Michigan probate court. However, the Commissioner sub-
sequently disallowed the estate tax deduction for these expenses.
The Tax Court affirmed the Commissioner's decision on the basis
of the requirement of the regulations that the sale and related expenses
be necessarily incurred in administration of the decedent's estate rather
than for the individual benefit of the devisees.1 ° The court concluded that
the sale of the property was not essential for the proper settlement of
the estate, and therefore no deduction for the selling expenses should be
allowed."
The Sixth Circuit reversed. The court first examined an earlier Tax
Court decision, Estate of David Smith.12 The issue in Smith was the
deductibility of expenses incurred when the decedent's sculptures were
sold in order to fund certain trusts established for his daughters. The
majority of the Tax Court held that the fact that expenses had been
allowed by the probate court was not sufficient for federal estate tax
Residence S 52,000.00
Cottage 24,750.00
U.S. Savings Bonds, Series E 24,069.62
350 Shares Continental Associates, Inc. common stock 350.00
Cash in bank account 1,807.45
Social Security benefit 97.90
Income on hand and accrued due
deceased's estate from Trust
Accounts 6,625.55
Household furniture at 253 Lewistion Road 5,841.25
Household furniture and personal effects
at 2315 Lake Shore Road 250.00
Jewelry 2,090.75
Refund of overpayment of 1967
Federal income tax 347.61
Proceeds from Connecticut General
annuity policy 5,004.38
$123,234.51
'Estate of Mabel F. Colton Park, 57 T.C. 705, 710 (1972).
irTreas. Reg. §§ 20.2053-3(a), 20.2053-3(d)(2) (1958), quoted in notes 3-4 supra.
1157 T.C. at 709.
1257 T.C. 650 (1972).
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deductibility without also meeting the criteria set forth in Regulation
section 20.2053-3(d)(2).13 The court felt that the standard contained in
the statute was only a threshold requirement with the ultimate test being
satisfaction of the regulations' necessity requirement."
Estate of Park found the reasoning in Smith unpersuasive."1 The
court reasoned that if the fiduciary, on the basis of his sound judgment,
as approved by the probate court, feels that the estate would benefit by
the sale of the real estate, a section 2053(a) deduction should not be
denied because the Commissioner does not think the sale was
necessary." Instead the Park court advocated a strict application of
section 2053(a) of the Code, 7 which requires only that the deduction be
allowable under state law.'"
It has long been established that deductions from federal tax liabil-
ity are questions of federal law, and are allowed only when clearly
provided in the appropriate statute." Estate of Park does not dispute
this, for it is precisely the standard for deductibility contained in section
2053(a) that the court feels called upon to defend. What the Sixth
Circuit has rejected is the Treasury's interpretation of the statute which
relegates the statutory standard of deductibility to a role preliminary to
the Treasury's own necessity standard.
Regulations sections 20.2053-3(a) and 20.2053-3(d)(2) have been in
effect in substantially identical language since 1919.11 Treasury regula-
tions and interpretations long continued without substantial change are
usually deemed to have received congressional approval, and hence have
the effect of being law.2' However, the rejection of these regulations by
the Sixth Circuit does not seem offensive to the deference usually given
"Id. at 661.
141d.
"1475 F.2d at 676.
|51d.
"While the literal wording of § 2053(a) refers to deductions "allowable" in the various juris-
dictions, the holding of Estate of Park limits deductibility to situations where the deduction actually
has been allowed by a state probate court. 475 F.2d at 676. The restriction represents the proper
application of § 2053(a). The propriety of a deduction depends upon the circumstances of the
administration of the particular estate. Accordingly, it would be unreasonable in applying
§ 2053(a) to a specific estate to speak of the allowability of a deduction without reference to
whether the deduction had been allowed or would likely be allowed if reviewed by the probate court.
"475 F.2d at 676.
"Deputy v. Dupont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435
(1934).
"Estate of David Smith, 57 T.C. 650, 664 (1972).
"United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1967); Taft v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 351,
357 (1938).
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long-standing regulations. The Supreme Court has previously ques-
tioned the significance of reenactment without expressed approval of the
prior interpretations."2 Furthermore, the disputed regulations were not
mentioned in the pertinent section of the House Report on the adoption
of section 2053Y.2 The only discussion in the report was of the state law
standard of deductibility.24 Therefore, it is a plausible argument that
Congress has considered and approved only that standard.
Estate of Park's defense of the state determination of deductibility
draws support from a number of judicial opinions outside the Sixth
Circuit which have questioned the propriety of the standard of the regu-
lations."5 In Estate of Louis Sternberger28 an executor was instructed
2Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
2H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1954) provides:
G. Expenses, indebtedness, and taxes (sec. 2053)
Funeral expenses, administration expenses, claims against the estate and unpaid mort-
gages are deductible in computing the taxable estate under present law. However, this
deduction is limited to those expenses allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction under
which the estate is being administered and cannot exceed the value of the property
included in the gross estate subject to claims, that is, the probate estate. Thus, if the
decedent has placed most of his assets in a trust (not includible in his probate estate)
funeral and other expenses actually paid . . . out of the trust assets are not allowed as
a deduction to the extent they exceed the value of the property in the probate estate.
These arbitrary distinctions have been removed under your committee's bill. Expen-
ses incurred in connection with property subjected to the estate tax, although not in the
probate estate, are to be allowed as deductions if the expenses are of the type which
would be allowed as deductions if the property were in the probate estate and they are
actually paid within 1 year of the decedent's death.
In addition, expenses in connection with property subject to claims are to be allowed
without regard to the total value of the probate estate if they are paid within the period
provided for the assessment of the estate tax.
(emphasis added.)
241d.
2With the exception of Smith, prior determinations within the Sixth Circuit failed to establish
a clear preference for either the necessity requirement of the regulations, or the exclusive state
determination of deductibility. In Estate of Goodwin v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 576 (6th Cir.
1953), a probate court in Ohio had determined that the daughters' claim against the estate qualified
for a § 2053(a) deduction. Despite the Commissioner's accusation that such was for the individual
benefit of the daughters rather than the estate as a whole, the Sixth Circuit allowed the deduction.
The allowance was reconciled with the regulations by reliance upon Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.30, 7
Fed. Reg. 1449 (1942), the predecessor of Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(2), see note 41 infra.
In Union Commerce Bank v. Commissioner, 339 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1964), a deduction for
interest on overdue debts not provided for in Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(a) was remanded for further
examination. However, there had not been a determination as to its deductibility by a probate
court.
The court in Central Trust Co. v. Welch, 304 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1962) allowed deduction of
attorney fees incurred in defending an estate. Reliance on the deference given probate court
determinations under Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(2), see note 41 infra, excused the court from
[Vol. 52
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under the decedent's will that he might sell the decedent's residence if
the surviving wife and daughter decided not to live there. The executor
subsequently sold the property and claimed a section 2053(a) adminis-
trative expense deduction for the related brokerage fee and legal expen-
ses. The court rejected the government's argument that the expense was
one of the trust created by the decedent rather than of his estate. Al-
though the New York Surrogate's Court found that the proceeds from
the sale were not needed to pay any debt of the estate,21 the court
allowed the deduction since the selling expenses were administration
expenses allowed by the laws of New York.
8
In Ballance v. United States,29 the Commissioner had rejected a
deduction under the predecessor of section 2053(a) allowable under Illi-
nois law for interest that accrued to debts of the estate when the fidu-
ciary delayed payment of the debts to avoid selling assets at a loss. The
Seventh Circuit refused to grant the regulations superiority to the stan-
dard contained in the statute and allowed the deduction.
30
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Commercial Na-
tional Bank v. United States,"' considered the deductibility of attor-
neys' fees included in the settlement of an heir's challenge to the dece-
dent's will. Since the assignment of costs was not petitioned for in the
probate court, it had not been declared as an administration expense
under North Carolina law and the deduction was not allowed.32 How-
ever, the court theorized that if that assignment of costs to the estate
had taken place according to the appropriate provision in the North
deciding the validity of § 20.2053-3(d)(2).
The Tax Court in Estate of Swayne, 43 T.C. 190 (1964), considered the deductibility under
§ 2053(a) of the selling expenses incurred when the decedent's son as executor sold the decedent's
residence. The sale had been authorized by the probate court but the deduction was denied for
failure to establish the necessity of the sale in accordance with § 20.2053-3(a). However, the
taxpayer had not challenged the validity of the regulation itself; he had relied solely on an assertion
that such sale was necessary.
2818 T.C. 836 (1952), affd, 207 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 187
(1955). The issue of deductibility was not raised on appeal.
2Id. at 842.
28d.
2347 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1965).
0"[T]he definition of 'administration expenses' in the treasury regulation as .... 'necessar-
ily' incurred in the administration of the estate cannot serve to override the statutory provision
• . . authorizing the deduction of '[s]uch amounts . . . for administration expenses . . . as are
allowed by the laws of the jurisdiction . . . . under which the estate is being administered.'" Id.
at 423.
31196 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1952).
12Id. at 184.
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Carolina General Statutes,33 the determination of the probate court
might have been controlling for the question of federal estate tax deduct-
ibility.34
Estate of Park does not seem to be a radical departure from preced-
ent. Rather, it makes explicit the dissatisfaction with the regulations
that was suggested in these earlier cases. Section 20.2053-3(a) pits the
interests of the estate as a whole against the interest of the individual
beneficiaries: "The expenses contemplated in law are such only as at-
tend the settlement of an estate. . . .Expenditures not essential to the
proper settlement of the estate, but incurred for the individual benefit
of the heirs . . . may not be taken as deductions."3 The statement is
internally inconsistent, for what benefits the estate as a whole also
benefits the heirs of that estate. Where there is only one beneficiary,
by necessity, there must be a one to one correlation between the benefit
enjoyed by the estate and that enjoyed by the individual beneficiary.
Of greater importance to the court in Estate of Park, however, were
the pragmatic considerations for the estate administrator. The Sixth
Circuit has realized that a fiduciary functions as the agent of the benefi-
ciaries as well as of the decedent.3 7 The fiduciary has a duty to protect
the assets of the estate. 8 This duty may require the selling of some
unproductive assets in order that the income producing assets will not
have to be sacrificed to meet the financial obligations of the estate.
Similarly, if the executor sees an opportunity to sell an asset at a sub-
stantial gain over its present value, or if he foresees a devaluation of the
33N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21 (1969), which is similar in pertinent part to the statute before the
court, provides that "Costs in the following matters shall be taxed against either party, or appor-
tioned among the parties, in the discretion of the court:. . .(2) Caveats to wills. . . ."The statute
further provides that "[T]he word 'costs' as the same appears and is used in this section shall be
construed to include reasonable attorneys' fees in such amounts as the court shall in its discretion
determine and allow . ..."
"Notwithstanding this established state law, the United States contends that the
attorneys' fees were not administrative expenses within the terms of the federal statute
: * .and that therefore even if they had been assessed as costs of the proceeding by the
judgment of the state court, they were not deductible for the purposes of the estate tax.
This position is doubtful since it would seem to have been the purpose of Congress to
follow the state law in the allowance for administrative expenses, but we do not find it
necessary to decide that question in this case.
196 F.2d at 185.
3Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(a) (1958), quoted in note 3 supra.
3 Sussman v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 507, 509 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); see Estate of Harry C.
Porter, 49 T.C. 207 (1967).
-1475 F.2d at 676.
"'First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 19, 29 (D. Kan. 1964).
[Vol. 52
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asset during the period of probate, he would be preserving the aggregate
asset value of the estate if he sells now, even though the sale was not
"necessarily" incurred in the sense that it was not needed to provide
funds to pay liens upon the estate. The sale of non-income producing
residential property will "preserve" the aggregate assets of the estate in
two ways. First, liquid assets which are not used in satisfaction of the
liens of the estate are able to be invested in income producing ventures.
Secondly, the maintenance cost of the residential property would con-
tinue to be a drain on the assets of the estate as long as the property is
held.
Aside from the purely economic considerations which render the
regulations' standard overly restrictive, there is a basic convenience
consideration. In Estate of Park there were two properties and four
sons. It is usually inconvenient for the administrator to make such a
division. 9 Such practical considerations are not recognized in the ne-
cessity requirement of the regulations. The decision in Estate of Park
returns the standard to one more in harmony with the realities of the
daily administration of estates.
If Estate of Park represents the proper standard for section 2053(a)
deductions, the prudent fiduciary would be wise to consider what vary-
ing fact situations might fit under its fiscal umbrella as administrative
expenses. Three areas, expenses incurred in will contests, appraisal
costs, and probate of an intestate's estate, should exemplify the consid-
erations and questions that would arise with any attempt to extend the
Estate of Park rationale to different fact situations.
In the past, the question of the deductibility of expenses incurred
in a will contest has defied any definitive determination. Some courts
have relied heavily on the probate court's determination 0 and the defer-
ence given this determination by the Treasury Regulation section
20.2053-1(b)(2).4 Others have required the will contest to meet the ne-
cessity requirement of Regulation section 20.2053-3(a).42 Under Estate
3"See Estate of Mabel F. Colton Park, 57 T.C. 705, 710 (1972).
'"E.g., Sussman v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 507 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
"E.g., Estate of Goodwin v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1953); Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2053-1(b)(2) (1958) provides in part: "Effect of court decree. The decision of a local court as
to the amount and allowability under local law of a claim or administration expense will ordinarily
be accepted if the court passes upon the facts upon which deductibility depends." (emphasis added.)
"In Estate of Louvine M. Baldwin, 59 T.C. 654 (1973), the court denied a § 2053(a) deduction
for the legal expenses of the sole surviving heir's attempt to enter caveats to the will of her mother.
The court conceded that state law controlled as to what was a proper administrative expense, but
followed the regulations in holding that the expenses incurred in reaching a settlement were for
19731
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of Park, the only question as to deductibility of such expense would be
its status under Michigan law.43 The applicable statute provides that the
court may charge reasonable expenses incurred by the fiduciary in
defense of the will.44 Since such expense would be readily admitted as
necessary in the administration of the estate, Estate of Park would
provide no additional area of deductibility for will contests in Michigan.
North Carolina, in contrast, is a jurisdiction where the Estate of
Park decision could provide a significant additional estate tax deduction
for will contest costs. The North Carolina statute provides that costs,
including reasonable attorneys' fees, may be taxed against either party
or apportioned among the parties in the discretion of the court.45 By
taxing the contestant's costs to the estate as an administrative expense,
a friendly probate court could minimize the potential loss of both the
contesting beneficiary and the net estate. In Commercial Bank, the
Fourth Circuit dealt with this situation in dicta. The court found the
government's contention that the costs of the will contest would not be
deductible even if they had been assessed against the estate as costs of
the proceeding to be "doubtful."4 If Estate of Park controlled in North
Carolina, the government position would be less than doubtful; it would
be futile.47
the individual benefit of the heir rather than the estate as a whole, and therefore not deductible as
a necessary administrative expense.
Similarly, a § 2053(a) deduction was not available in Jacobs v. United States, 248 F. Supp.
695 (E.D. Tex. 1965), for attorney's fees incurred by the claimant trying to get the whole estate
for himself. Again, failure to meet the necessity requirement of Regulation § 20.2053-3, in that
the expense was for the individual benefit of the claimant rather than the estate, precluded a
§ 2053(a) deduction.
However, there had not been a state court determination of deductibility in either of these
cases. In Baldwin, the question of the deductibility of attorney fees for the daughter was not raised
in the probate proceeding, and in Jacobs, the will had not been submitted to probate. If Estate of
Park is limited to the situation where there actually has been a determination of deductibility by
the probate court, the IRS would not have to adjust its approach to cases which fit the procedural
context of Baldwin and Jacobs.
4 See note 2 supra.
"MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(94) (1962).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21 (1969), quoted in note 33 supra.
"Commercial Nat'l Bank v. United States, 196 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1952).
"The Commissioner could argue along the lines of Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456
(1967), that a determination of a state tribunal is not binding on a federal court, unless it is a
determination of the highest court of that state. However, the language of Bosch distinguishes that
case from a § 2053(a) situation:
Next, it must be remembered that it was a federal taxing statute that Congress enacted
and upon which we are here passing. Therefore, in construing it, we must look to the
legislative history surrounding it. We find the report of the Senate Finance Committee
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Estate of Park may pose a problem in those instances where an
expense must be incurred for tax purposes which is unnecessary for
settlement of the estate under local probate procedures. A common
expense of this type is appraisal costs. Typically, state law requires a
valuation for estate inventory purposes which is obtained quickly and
and often perfunctorily by a court appointed appraiser. The appointed
appraiser often has no expertise in valuing the property and is awarded
a relatively low fee by the court. If commercial real estate, closely held
securities, antiques, works of art or other similar items are involved, the
executor may require the services of several qualified appraisers to ob-
tain valuations for federal estate tax purposes. The fees of the appraisers
may be many times the amount allowable under state law for court
appointed appraisers. If Estate of Park means to limit the deduction to
that allowable (and allowed) by the local court, the result will be that
significant and required costs of settling an estate may not be deductible.
Had Mabel Colton Park died intestate, the applicable Michigan
statute would allow a section 2053(a) deduction. The sale of intestate
recommending enactment of the marital deduction used very guarded language in refer-
ring to the very question involved here. It said that "proper regard" not finality, should
be given to "interpretations of the will" by state courts and then "only when entered by
a court in a bona fide adversary proceeding . . . .If Congress had intended state trial
determination to have that effect on the federal actions, it certainly would have said so
Id. at 463-64 (emphasis added.) The relevant part of the House Report on the reenactment of
§ 2053, see note 23 supra, contained no such restrictive language. Instead it mentioned only the
state court's determination as the basis for deductibility.
4 MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(462) (1962) provides:
Sale of real estate of decedent; when may be authorized . . . duty of fiduciary. SEC. 2.
Real estate of a deceased person, or any interest therein, may be sold upon petition of
the executor or administrator under license of the probate court in the following cases.
I. When it shall appear to the court that the personal estate of a deceased person
in the hands of his executor or administrator is insufficient to pay the debts of the
deceased and the charges of administering his estate, or whenever it shall appear to the
court that it is for the best interest of all persons interested in the estate that his real
estate or some part thereof be sold for such purpose in lieu of disposing of the personal
estate;
2. When it shall appear to the court that sale of such real estate is necessary to
preserve the estate or to prevent a sacrifice thereof, or to carry out the provision of a
will;
3. When a testator shall have given any legacy by will that is effectual to pass or
charge real estate, and his personal property is insufficient to pay such legacy, together
with his debts and charges of administration;
4. When a testator shall have given real estate to two [2] or more persons, or when
a person shall have died intestate, and it shall appear to the court that it is necessary or
will be for the best interests of the persons interested in said real estate as such . ..
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property, necessarily approved by the probate judge,49 would receive the
Estate of Park endorsement as fiduciary discretion exercised with ap-
proval of the probate court. This gives a tax advantage to the heirs if
the land is sold for their benefit while still under the fiduciary's adminis-
tration.
In contrast, the administrator of an intestate's estate in North
Carolina does not have the discretionary power to sell real estate. Real
estate may be sold only when the outstanding debts of the decedent's
estate require such a sale.5 Thus it appears that Estate of Park would
have no significant impact upon the asset management considerations
of an administrator of an intestate's estate in North Carolina.
CONCLUSION
In proclaiming the standard for a section 2053(a) administration
expense deduction to be the good conscience of "the fiduciary on the
basis of his sound judgment, as approved by the probate court ... .,"I
Estate of Park could cause the federal government to lose considerable
revenue under the decisions of state tribunals that do not have the
Treasury's concern for tax revenues at heart. However, the size of the
federal government's coffers should have no bearing on the validity of
section 20.2053-3(d)(2). In its zeal to protect the general policy that
heirs to sell the samefor purpose of distribution: Provided, That [sic] application under
this subdivision shall be approved in writing by the persons owning a majority interest
of the real estate proposed to be sold ....
(emphasis added.)
"'MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(475) (1962) provides:
Order for sale, conveyance or lease; when judge to make. SEc. 15. If the judge of probate
shall be satisfied, after a full hearing upon the petition, and an examination of the proofs
and allegations of the parties interested, that a sale, transfer, conveyance or lease...
be assented to by all persons interested, he shall thereupon make an order of sale,
authorizing the fiduciary to sell, transfer, convey, or lease the whole, or so much and
such part of the real estate, interest therein, or easement, described in the petition as he
shall judge necessary or beneficial.
ON.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-81 (1966).
"Id.; But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-96 (1966) which provides that in a testate situation, an
executor may be provided with a discretionary power of sale. If Estate of Park controlled in North
Carolina, a significant anomaly would result. Not only could discretionary sale for the benefit of
the beneficiaries not allowable in the intestate situation be made under a power given the executor
in the will, but also the related expenses could potentially qualify for a § 2053(a) deduction. This
variance is conducive to a friendly executor and friendly probate court allowing tile beneficiaries
to realize a tax break on the sale of unwanted property while it is still in probate.
5475 F.2d at 676.
PRIVATE INCOME A VERA GING
wealth should not be transferred at death tax free,53 the Treasury's
necessity requirement goes beyond any standard suggested by Congress.
The rejection of the validity of the regulations by Estate of Park issues
a challenge to the Congress aptly stated by Judge Goffe in his dissenting
opinion in Estate of Smith:
If additional safeguards are needed they should come from the
Congress, not from the Secretary or his delegate in the form of unau-
thorized regulations. . . [T]he estate tax must be safeguarded from
unauthorized and unwarranted limitations imposed by regulations as
well as abuses which may occur elsewhere."
ROBERT DEWITT DEARBORN
Income Tax - Triumph of Form Over Substance-Private Income Aver-
aging
Taxpayers have long attempted to avoid the payment of federal
income taxes by transferring their future income to other persons and
having the transferees pay the taxes on the income at a lesser rate. The
Internal Revenue Service and the majority of the cases that have consid-
ered these schemes have disallowed such anticipatory assignments of
income and have assessed taxes against the original recipient of the
income, the assignor, in the years in which the income is received by the
assignee. In the recent case of Estate of Stranahan v. Commissioner,'
however, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit allowed a taxpayer-
assignor to avoid paying taxes on the income in the later years; the
assignee paid the taxes instead. This avoidance was accomplished by the
taxpayer "selling" his rights to the future income and paying taxes on
the "sale price" in the year of transfer, a maneuver which resulted in a
substantial tax saving for the assignor.
2
This decision is a poor one for two reasons. Specifically, the money
received by the taxpayer from his assignee had more of the characteris-
tics of a loan than payment for the purchase of an asset. If the transfer
of the 122,820 dollars were a loan, there would have been no tax conse-
quences at the time of the assignment of the income, and the income-
"United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118, 131 (1963).
"57 T.C. at 665.
1472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1973).
21d. at 869-70.
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